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1. Introduction 
 
Parents and children are connected in various ways, and one of the most important ways in 
which they are connected is through intergenerational transfers (i.e., bequests and inter vivos 
transfers) from parents to children. The desire to leave bequests and other intergenerational 
transfers to one’s children is likely to affect the economic behavior of parents in many ways. 
In other words, it is quite possible that parents planning to leave a bequest to their children will 
behave very differently from those not planning to leave a bequest to their children. For 
example, it is quite possible that parents planning to leave a bequest to their children will save 
more than those not planning to leave a bequest to their children because they need to save not 
only to finance their own retirement needs but also to leave a bequest to their children. Indeed, 
many previous studies have examined the impact of bequest motives on saving and wealth 
accumulation behavior, and most of them have found that parents planning to leave a bequest 
to their children do, in fact, save more than those not planning to leave a bequest to their 
children (see, for example, Horioka et al. (1996), Horioka et al. (2002), and Niimi and Horioka 
(2018); see Hurd (1990) for a comprehensive survey). 
 
By the same token, it is quite possible that parents planning to leave a bequest to their children 
will work more at the intensive margin (i.e., work more hours per day and/or more days per 
year) and/or at the extensive margin (i.e., work longer and retire later) than those not planning 
to leave a bequest to their children so that they can increase their lifetime incomes and thence 
the amount that they can bequeath to their children. Moreover, work-related outcomes at both 
the intensive and extensive margins may differ by the nature of bequest motives (for example, 
by whether they are motivated by altruistic or strategic/exchange considerations). Surprisingly, 
however, no research has been done on the bequest-work relationship of parents that 
differentiates between those with different bequest motives. This paper intends to fill this gap 
in the literature. 
 
The impact of bequest motives on the work-related outcomes of parents may be especially 
pronounced in the case of Japan where bequest motives are relatively strong. As Table 2 shows, 
34.0 percent of respondents have a strong bequest motive, 47.3 percent have a weak bequest 
motive, and only 18.7 percent have no bequest motive at all.1 Moreover, the social norm in 
Japan has traditionally been for children (especially the eldest son) to provide care to elderly 
parents, and until a public long-term care insurance program was introduced in 2000, the 
elderly in Japan had to rely on their children to provide care or to pay the full cost of hiring 
professional care workers. Furthermore, even today, the financial burden of elderly care falls 
largely upon the elderly themselves because the public long-term care insurance system has a 
co-payment of 10 percent or more and also has strict eligibility requirements, as a result of 
which only care services that are concomitant with one’s care needs are covered by insurance. 
Thus, it seems likely that a substantial proportion of Japanese has an interest in inducing their 
children to provide care during old age and in using bequests for this purpose (see Horioka, et 
al. (2018) for corroboration of this point).  
 
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of bequest motives 
on the work and planned retirement decisions of households in Japan. We first do a theoretical 
analysis of the impact of altruistic and exchange bequest motives on work-related outcomes at 
 
1 However, Horioka (2014) finds that bequest motives are even stronger in India and the United States than in 
Japan although they are of roughly comparable strength in China and Japan. Thus, if we find bequest motives to 
have a significant impact on work-related outcomes in Japan, their impact is likely to be even greater in India and 
the US, where bequest motives are even stronger.. 
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the intensive and extensive margins. We then test our theoretical model’s predictions 
empirically using micro data from the Preference Parameters Study (Kurashi no Konomi to 
Manzokudo ni tsuite no Chousa) of Osaka University. Consistent with our theoretical model’s 
predictions, we find that respondents with an altruistic or strategic/exchange bequest motive 
work more (empirically measured by individual’s working hours per week) at the intensive 
margin than those without any bequest motive but that respondents with a strategic or exchange 
bequest motive work less at the extensive margin (i.e., retire earlier, empirically measured by 
planned/desired retirement age) than those without any bequest motive. Our findings for the 
strategic or exchange bequest motive are entirely plausible because respondents with such a 
motive may want to work harder than others before they retire so that they can earn more, leave 
a larger bequest to their children, and elicit more care from them but that they may want to 
retire earlier than others so that they can start receiving care from their children sooner. 
 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the altruistic bequest-work relationship in Japan is driven 
by relatively young respondents (those aged less than 40 years), which suggests that altruistic 
respondents decide their work behavior at a relatively young age. Interestingly, the strategic or 
exchange bequest-work relationship is driven primarily by the married male sample. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that married males have a greater demand for care from their 
children because they as well as their wives are potential care recipients.  
 
We employ a battery of robustness checks to show that our empirical findings concerning the 
bequest-work relationship are highly robust, remaining significant and consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical model even when (i) we use a dummy variable for full-time work 
in lieu of the number of hours worked per week as an alternative measure of the intensive 
margin, (ii) we include a large number of control variables relating to individual- and 
household-specific factors to ensure that the bequest-work relationship is free from the 
endogeneity bias arising from omitted variable(s), (iii) we ensure that our results are free from 
reverse relationship bias, and (iv) we add a number of proxies for wealth to eliminate the 
possibility that bequest motives are merely acting as a proxy for wealth, as we discuss in more 
detail in section 3.  
 
We make an original contribution to the literature in at least four respects. First, it is one of the 
first papers to conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of bequest motives on 
the work and retirement behavior of parents at both the intensive and extensive margins. Many 
studies have analyzed the impact of time and monetary transfers from parents on the recipients’ 
(children’s) work behavior (see, for example, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), Joulfaian and Wilhelm 
(1994), Wolff (2006), Dustman et al. (2009), Gong (2009), Brown et al. (2010), Dimova and 
Wolff (2011), Elinder et al. (2012), Blau and Goodstein (2016), and Doorley and Pestel (2016) 
for studies for other countries and Sugano and Matsuyama (2017) and Niizeki and Hori (2019) 
for studies for Japan), and most of these studies find that the receipt of bequests and inter vivos 
transfers reduces the work behavior (the workforce participation, the number of hours worked, 
and the retirement age) of recipients (the so-called “Carnegie conjecture”). However, we have 
not been able to find any papers that analyze the impact of bequest motives on the work 
behavior of bequest givers (parents). The only related paper of which we are aware is Brown 
et al. (2015), which finds that Croatian retirees are more likely to opt for a larger but deferred 
stream of pension benefits if they have a stronger bequest motive. To the extent that those who 
choose to defer are more likely to continue working, this result implies that bequest motives 
have an impact on retirement behavior. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the 
first to conduct an analysis of the impact of bequest motives on work and retirement behavior 
for the case of Japan. Third, this paper uses micro data from the Preference Parameters Study, 
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which reports an exhaustive list of bequest motives along with respondent’s detailed attributes, 
such as wage, family income, full-time vs part-time, number of hours worked per week, and 
planned retirement age, pension, etc. Fourth, this paper distinguishes between different bequest 
motives (e.g., altruistic, strategic/exchange motives, etc.), as discussed in more detail later. 
 
Our findings have important policy implications for policymakers in Japan. Since individual 
work behavior can be altered by changing inheritance taxes, it is very important for 
policymakers to realize that the bequest-work relationship exists but that it varies by bequest 
motive in Japan. In the case of a strategic or exchange bequest motive, which affects parents’ 
work behavior as well as retirement decision, inheritance tax policy should be set taking 
account both the increased work effort at the intensive margin as well as the induced retirement 
effect of this motive. In the case of the altruistic bequest motive, by contrast, there does not 
seem to be any need to worry about the induced retirement effect, meaning that lowering 
inheritance taxes will unambiguously increase labor supply by encouraging individuals to leave 
bequests. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical model of 
the impact of bequest motives on work and retirement behavior, section 3 provides empirical 
evidence by using micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University to test 
the predictions of our theoretical model about the impact of bequest motives on work behavior 
(e.g., employment status, working hours, and planned retirement age), and section 4 is a 
concluding section. 
 
 
2. The Theoretical Model  
 
In this section, we present a theoretical model that shows the impact of bequest motives on 
work and retirement behavior. In subsection 2.1, we present the basic setup of the model; in 
subsection 2.2, we consider the case of altruistic bequest motives; in subsection 2.3, we 
consider the case of strategic or exchange bequest motives; and in subsection 2.4, we 
summarize our findings. 
 
 
2.1. Basic Setup 
 
Dynamic optimization models resulting in closed-form solutions to endogenous consumption, 
saving and labor supply are, to our knowledge, rare. They are often used in quantitative finance 
and related economics literature to investigate decision-making under uncertainty. For example, 
Rogers (2013, p. 110) augments a standard infinite-horizon Merton problem with the intensive 
margin of labor supply and numerically simulates the solutions. Similarly, Rogers (2013, p. 
99) presents a Merton-type model with endogenous retirement and presents an explicit solution 
to the critical value of wealth that would trigger retirement. Farhi and Panageas (2007) 
endogenize risky investment with endogenous retirement choice only. This allows the authors 
to focus on closed-form solutions. Our model abstracts from risky investment and focuses on 
closed-form solutions pertinent to both margins of labor supply in the context of parent-
offspring transfers. The dynamic quantitative-theoretical literature with labor supply is large. 
The interested reader might refer, for instance, to Bagchi’s (2015) study that numerically 
simulates the effect of the U.S. Social Security system on different margins of labor supply in 
an environment with mortality and labor income risk and also cites many studies that look at 
dynamic pension reforms and labor supply distortions.   
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Our model features a standard bounded optimal control framework in which we focus on 
closed-form solutions by explicitly taking into account the time constraint on leisure. Most 
standard theoretical studies with closed-form solutions consider an interior solution with 
respect to labor supply (e.g., Bütler 2001) for ease of exposition, but we follow the approach 
developed in Gahramanov and Tang (2016a; 2016b) for deriving the optimal age of retirement 
and hours worked. In addition, under various assumptions, we are able to provide analytic 
solutions for the optimal inheritance level.  
 
Our model is set in continuous time, and time itself is denoted by 𝑡. To derive closed-form 
solutions, we attempt to keep the environment as simple as possible. The main decision-maker 
(the “agent” or “parent”) enters the workforce at birth (𝑡 ൌ 0) and exits the model by age 𝑡 ൌ
𝑇 ൐ 0. The time endowment is normalized to unity. The retirement age (𝑇௥௘௧) must be chosen 
optimally. For each unit of labor endogenously devoted to market work at date 𝑡, exogenously 
determined efficiency units (𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ) are supplied to production. The wage per labor efficiency 
unit is 𝑤 ൐ 0. All wage income not consumed flows into the individual’s financial asset 
account 𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ, which grows at rate 𝑟. The main decision-maker starts the life cycle with a 
given amount of bequest received from her own parent (𝐵ோ ൒ 0), and she finishes the life cycle 
with some assets 𝑘 (determined endogenously) that she will bequeath to her offspring at time 
𝑡 ൌ 𝑇.  
 
Suppose that culture and social norms help to shape the care level a person might devote to her 
parent (and possibly to others, such as other family members). The overall amount of care 
requires a sacrifice of time and is a strictly increasing function of the bequest received (see 
subsection 2.2 for more discussion of this.)  
  
Remark 1. From here on in, we assume that the main decision-maker starts her life with no 
assets (𝐵ோ ൌ 0), and provides no care to her own parents. This assumption is innocuous 
because at the start of the model, 𝐵ோ  and the resulting care-to-own-parents will be 
exogenously given by assumption and will be mainly driven by the decisions of the parents of 
the main decision-maker. Setting these values to zero allows us to state our forthcoming 
solutions in a more compact way and to focus exclusively on the interaction between the main 
decision-making agent and her children.    
 
The agent enjoys (derives utility from) private consumption (𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ) and personal leisure (𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ). 
Note that the agent’s hours of work (1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ) are endogenous since 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ is a choice variable. 
In what follows, we consider two separate cases—the case of an altruistic bequest motive and 
the case of a selfishly motivated strategic or exchange bequest motive.  
 
 
2.2. Case 1: Altruistic Bequest Motives 
 
When modeling the case of altruistic bequest motives, we assume that the bequest left by the 
parent increases her utility because it increases the present value of resources available to her 
child and thus by implication the child’s ultimate consumption. By contrast, Wilhelm (1996), 
Kopczuk (2010), and especially Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) have in mind Barro-type recursive 
altruism models in which the parent cares about the consumption and therefore the well-being 
of her children, grandchildren, and more distant descendants. These models assume that the 
inheritance provided by the parent directly influences the consumption available to the child 
(see eq. 1 on p. 208 in Laitner and Ohlsson, 2001). Laitner and Ohlsson (2001, p. 210) and 
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Kopczuk (2010, p. 6) differentiate our formulation from the altruism model and refer to it as 
the “egoistic model” or the “joy-of-giving model,” and indeed the two formulations have very 
different implications for public policy. However, since we are not concerned about Ricardian 
equivalence or tax considerations, we can presume that this fine distinction in the parent’s 
motivations is not important for our purposes and that our Case 1 corresponds in broad terms 
to the “altruistic bequest motive” setting. Wilhelm (2010, pp. 880-881) makes a similar 
argument (see also Arrondel and Masson, 2006, and Laferrere and Wolff, 2006).  
 
The objective in our altruism model is to maximize   
 
 𝑈 ൌ න 𝑒ିఘ௧ሺ𝜙ଵln ሾ𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሿ ൅ 𝜙ଶ lnሾ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሿሻ𝑑𝑡்଴ ൅ 𝛾𝑒ିఘ் lnሾΨሺ𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻሻሿ, (1) 
 
where 𝜙ଵ, 𝜙ଶ, 𝛾 are positive constants, and 𝜌 is nonnegative.  
 
Remark 2. Let function Ψ summarize the present value of economic resources available to 
the child over the latter’s lifetime as seen from the perspective of the decision-making parent. 
We assume that the parent believes that if her offspring is given a larger bequest, this will 
increase the present value of resources available to the latter; that is, డஏ௞ሺ்ሻ ൐ 0.2  
 
Observe from (1) that a function of the terminal stock 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ is added to the integral, and this 
“scrap value function” has the standard economic interpretation (e.g., Léonard and Van Long, 
1992, pp. 226-229). In other words, the parent attaches some positive value to what she leaves 
behind at time 𝑇 because she has an altruistic bequest motive. 
 
The optimization problem is subject to the dynamic budget equation, control constraints, and 
the endpoint conditions given in (2)-(5):  
 
 𝑑𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑑𝑡 ൌ 𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሺ1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሻ െ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ, (2) 
 0 ൑ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൑ 1, (3) 
 𝑘ሺ0ሻ ൌ 0, (4) 
 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ ൌ free. (5) 
 
Equation (4) is consistent with Remark 1. Note that the chosen utility function allows us to 
ignore the additional control constraint on 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ. Further, given (5), the solution to the problem 
can be obtained by using a transversality condition for a free endpoint with scrap value that 
would essentially equate the marginal benefit of an increase in the terminal asset level to the 
associated marginal cost over the entire time interval. For ease of exposition, however, we 
proceed with the two-step procedure outlined in the remark below when deriving the solution.    
 
Remark 3. Here we adapt the two-step solution strategy as follows: (i) solve the optimization 
problem treating 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ as fixed (i.e., 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ is arbitrarily fixed at some amount of 𝐵ீ  or 
 
2 In principle, it is possible that a larger bequest would discourage, say, work effort and ultimately leave the child 
financially worse off (or no better off), but we assume that the parent rules out such a possibility when making a 
decision.  
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“bequest given”), and then (ii) solve for the optimal value of 𝐵ீ  given that consumption and 
labor supply are chosen optimally for every possible 𝐵ீ  value.3  
 
In the first step, we thus define the Hamiltonian function  
 
 𝐻ଵ ൌ 𝑒ିఘ௧ሺ𝜙ଵln ሾ𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሿ ൅ 𝜙ଶln ሾ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሿሻ ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻሺ𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ൅ 𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሺ1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሻ െ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሻ, (6) 
 
where 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ is a dynamic multiplier. Optimal controls must satisfy the following conditions: 
 
 
𝑑𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ
𝑑𝑡 ൌ
𝜕𝐻ଵ
𝜕𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሺ1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሻ െ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ, (7) 
 
𝑑𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ
𝑑𝑡 ൌ െ
𝜕𝐻ଵ
𝜕𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ െ𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑟, (8) 
and 
 
 
maxሼଵି௟ሺ௧ሻஹ଴,௖ሺ௧ሻሽ 𝐻ଵ ⇔ 
 maxሼଵି௟ሺ௧ሻஹ଴,௖ሺ௧ሻሽሼ𝐻ଶ
ൌ 𝑒ିఘ௧ሺ𝜙ଵ lnሾ𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሿ ൅ 𝜙ଶ lnሾ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሿሻ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻሺ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሺ1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሻ െ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሻሽ. 
(9) 
 
A necessary condition is that there exists a dynamic multiplier 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൑ 0 such that if the 
Lagrangian of the Hamiltonian 
 
 𝐻 ൌ 𝑒ିఘ௧ሺ𝜙ଵln ሾ𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሿ ൅ 𝜙ଶ lnሾ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሿሻ ൅ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻሺ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሺ1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሻെ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሻ ൅ 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻሺ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ െ 1ሻ, (10) 
 
then (11)-(14) hold:  
 
 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଵ𝑒
ିఘ௧𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻିଵ െ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0, (11) 
 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଶ𝑒
ିఘ௧𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻିଵ െ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0, (12) 
 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻሺ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ െ 1ሻ ൌ 0, (13) 
 1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൒ 0. (14) 
 
We focus our attention on standard labor supply behavior. Let there be some internal point in 
time 𝑇௥௘௧ ∈ ሺ0,𝑇ሻ (to be determined) on or after which the agent stops working, and hence 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 1. Thus,  
 
 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൏ 1 for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇௥௘௧ሻ, (15) 
 
 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 1 for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ𝑇௥௘௧ ,𝑇ሿ. (16) 
 
 
3 Furthermore, since the solution to such dynamic problems can still easily become cumbersome, we will assume 
that the discount rate and the interest rate are equal in order to facilitate the analysis. 
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The complementarity condition implies that if 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0, then 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൏ 1, and we have the 
following system of equations: 
 
 ൬𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ൰
ᇱ
ൌ ൬𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሺ1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሻ െ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻെ𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑟 ൰ (17) 
 for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇௥௘௧ሻ.  
 
If, on the other hand, 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൏ 0, then 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 1, and we have the following system of equations: 
 
 ൬𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ൰
ᇱ
ൌ ൬𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ െ 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻെ𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑟 ൰  (18) 
 for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ𝑇௥௘௧,𝑇ሿ. Hence, the optimal solution can be found by joining together the solutions of 
(17)-(18). Note that the function 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ is defined over the entire planning interval, and from 
(17) and (18) we see that it obeys the same law of motion. Since the function is continuous, we 
obtain 
 
 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑎𝑒ି௥௧ for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇ሿ, (19) 
 
where 𝑎 is a constant to be determined.  
 
From (11), we obtain 
 
 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଵ𝑒ିఘ௧/𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ. (20) 
 
Now, note that if 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0, then 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൏ 1. Hence, (12) leads to  
 
 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑎𝑒ି௥௧ ൌ 𝜙ଶ𝑒ିఘ௧𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻିଵሺ1/𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻሻ. (21) 
 
Recall that 𝑙ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൌ 1. Substituting this into (21) (and recalling that 𝑟 ൌ 𝜌), we can express 
the constant 𝑎 in terms of 𝑇௥௘௧ as 
 
 𝑎 ≡ 𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଶ/ሺ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻሻ. (22) 
 
Thus, 
 
 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑒ି௥௧ for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇ሿ. (23) 
 
Substituting (23) into (20), we obtain from (18) 
 
 
𝑑𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ
𝑑𝑡 ൌ 𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ െ
𝜙ଵ
𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ, (24) 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ𝑇௥௘௧,𝑇ሿ.  
 
Using (5) for an arbitrarily fixed terminal stock value 𝐵ீ , we derive the solution to (24) as 
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 𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଵ𝑟𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൫1 െ 𝑒௥ሺ௧ି்ሻ൯ ൅ 𝐵ீ𝑒௥ሺ௧ି்ሻ, (25) 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ𝑇௥௘௧,𝑇ሿ.  
 
Evaluating (25) at 𝑡 ൌ 𝑇௥௘௧, we obtain 
 
 
𝑘ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ≡ Λଵሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ
ൌ 𝜙ଵ𝑟𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൫1 െ 𝑒௥ሺ ೝ்೐೟ି்ሻ൯ ൅ 𝐵ீ𝑒௥ሺ ೝ்೐೟ି்ሻ. (26) 
 
Next, substituting (23) into (11) and (12) and considering the 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0 case (recall that 𝑟 ൌ
𝜌), we solve for the optimal consumption and leisure paths as functions of 𝑇௥௘௧: 
 
 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଵ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ, (27) 
 
 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଶ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ,  (28) 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇௥௘௧ሻ.  
 
Remark 4. Note from (28) that for the agent to retire before exiting the model, it is necessary 
that the labor productivity profile, 𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ, decline sufficiently rapidly after some point in time.   
  
Substituting (27) and (28) into (17), we obtain 
 
 
𝑑𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ
𝑑𝑡 ൌ 𝑟𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൬1 െ 𝜙ଶ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ൰ െ 𝜙ଵ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ, (29) 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇௥௘௧ሻ. Using (4), the solution to (29) is  
 
𝑘ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑒௥௧ න ൬𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑢ሻ ൬1 െ 𝜙ଶ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑢ሻ൰௧଴
െ 𝜙ଵ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ൰ 𝑒
ି௥௨𝑑𝑢, (30) 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇௥௘௧ሻ. Expression (30) implies that  
 
 
𝑘ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ≡ Λଶሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ
ൌ 𝑒௥ ೝ்೐೟ න ൬𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൬1 െ 𝜙ଶ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ൰ೝ்೐೟଴
െ 𝜙ଵ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ൰ 𝑒
ି௥௧𝑑𝑡. (31) 
 
Hence, for a given bequest amount 𝐵ீ , 𝑇௥௘௧ is the solution to the following equation: 
 
 Λଵሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൌ Λଶሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ. (32) 
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Remark 5. It is clear from (32) that even a simple dynamic model can easily lead to a 
cumbersome solution, and it might be impossible to derive a closed-form solution. To obtain a 
tractable, closed-form solution, we introduce additional simplifying assumptions. First, we 
assume that the interest rate 𝑟 ൌ 0 (an assumption that is quite reasonable in the case of Japan). 
Also, we assume that 𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 1 െ ሺ1/𝑇ሻ𝑡. 
 
Consequently, recalling (22), we obtain 
 
 lim௥→଴ Λଵሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൌ 𝐵ீ ൅ 𝑤ሺ𝑇 െ 𝑇௥௘௧ሻଶ𝜙ଵ𝑇𝜙ଶ , (33) 
  lim௥→଴ Λଶሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൌ 𝑤𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሺ2𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ െ 2𝑇𝜙ଵሻ2𝑇𝜙ଶ . (34) 
  
Thus, setting (33) equal to (34), we can solve for the optimal retirement age for a given bequest 
amount. Under the assumption of both roots being real, a positive root takes the form 
 
 𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ ൌ െ𝑇𝜙ଵ ൅ √𝐷/𝑤𝜙ଶ , (35)  
 
where 
  
 𝐷 ≡ 𝑤𝑇ሺ2𝐵ீ𝜙ଶଶ ൅ 𝑤𝑇𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2𝜙ଶሻሻ. (36)  
 
Remark 6. It is clear from (36) that an exogenous increase in the amount of the bequest given 
𝐵ீ  would raise the age of retirement. However, the next task is to find the optimal bequest 
amount. For that purpose, we need to specify the form of the Ψ function.   
 
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the parent believes that a one-unit increase in the 
bequest given increases the lifetime well-being of her offspring by 𝑠 ൐ 0 units, where 𝑠 can 
be sufficiently small. Let  
 
 Ψሺ𝐵ீሻ ൌ 𝑠𝐵ீ . (37) 
 
Recalling that 𝑟 ൌ 𝜌 ൌ 0, using (22), (27)-(28), (35), and (37), let us rewrite (1) as 
 
 Γଵ ൅ Γଶ, (38) 
 
where  
 
 
Γଵ ≡ 𝜙ଵ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଵ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯቉ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯଴ 𝑑𝑡
൅ 𝜙ଶ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଶ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ቉ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯଴ 𝑑𝑡
൅ 𝛾 lnሾ𝑠𝐵ீሿ, 
(39) 
 Γଶ ≡ 𝜙ଵ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଵ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯቉்ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯ 𝑑𝑡 ൅ 𝜙ଶ න lnሾ1ሿ்ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯ 𝑑𝑡. (40) 
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The optimal bequest amount 𝐵ீ  is the one that solves 
 
 𝜕Γଵ𝜕𝐵ீ ൅
𝜕Γଶ
𝜕𝐵ீ ൌ 0. (41) 
 
Under the assumption of real roots, the optimal bequest amount (𝐵௢௣௧ீ ൌ 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ௢௣௧) is 
 
 𝐵௢௣௧ீ ൌ 𝑤𝛾൫𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ ൅ 𝛾 െ ඥ𝐷ଵ൯𝑇𝜙ଶଶ , (42) 
 
where 
 
 𝐷ଵ ≡ ሺ𝑇𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝛾ሻሺ𝑇𝜙ଵ ൅ 2𝑇𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝛾ሻ. (43) 
 
Substituting (42) into (35), we obtain the optimal retirement age (𝑇௥௘௧௢௣௧) as follows: 
 
 𝑇௥௘௧௢௣௧ ൌ െ
1
𝜙ଶ ቆ𝑇𝜙ଵ െ ට𝐷ଶ െ 2𝛾ඥ𝐷ଵቇ. (44) 
 
where 
 
 𝐷ଶ ≡ 2𝛾ଶ ൅ 2𝑇𝛾ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ ൅ 𝑇ଶ𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2𝜙ଶሻ. (45) 
 
Analogously, we can find the optimal leisure profile (𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧), and ultimately the optimal labor 
supply (𝐿𝑆ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧) during the working life as follows: 
 
 𝐿𝑆ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧ ≡ 1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧ ൌ 𝑇𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝑡𝜙ଶ െ ට𝐷ଶ െ 2𝛾ඥ𝐷ଵሺ𝑡 െ 𝑇ሻ𝜙ଶ . (46) 
 
The optimal consumption profile takes the form  
 
 𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧ ൌ 𝑤𝜙ଵ
𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ െ ට𝐷ଶ െ 2𝛾ඥ𝐷ଵ
𝑇𝜙ଶଶ . (47) 
 
Notice that 
 
 𝜕𝐵௢௣௧ீ𝜕𝛾 ൌ െ𝑤
ቀඥ𝐷ଵ െ 𝛾 െ 𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻቁ ൫ඥ𝐷ଵ െ 𝛾൯
𝑇𝜙ଶଶඥ𝐷ଵ
. (48) 
 
The term ඥ𝐷ଵ is strictly less than ሺ𝛾 ൅ 𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ, while ඥ𝐷ଵ is strictly greater than 𝛾. 
Therefore, (48) is strictly positive in sign, indicating that the more the parent cares for her 
child’s financial well-being, the larger the bequest she intends to leave. Similarly,  
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𝜕𝐿𝑆ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧
𝜕𝛾
ൌ 4𝛾ଶ ൅ 6𝑇𝛾ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ ൅ 2𝑇ଶ𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2𝜙ଶሻ െ ሺ4𝛾 ൅ 2𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻሻඥ𝐷ଵ2ሺ𝑡 െ 𝑇ሻ𝜙ଶඥ𝐷ଵට𝐷ଶ െ 2𝛾ඥ𝐷ଵ . (49) 
 
The denominator of (49) is negative since up to the age of retirement, 𝑡 ൏ 𝑇. The numerator 
is negative since the term ሺ4𝛾 ൅ 2𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻሻଶ𝐷ଵ  exceeds the term ሺ4𝛾ଶ ൅ 6𝑇𝛾ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅𝜙ଶሻ ൅ 2𝑇ଶ𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2𝜙ଶሻሻଶ by a positive amount 4𝑇ଷ𝜙ଶଶሺ2𝛾ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶሻ ൅ 𝑇𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2𝜙ଶሻሻ. 
Thus, an increase in the strength of the altruistic bequest motive increases the number of 
working hours. 
 
Finally, 
 
 𝜕𝑇௥௘௧
௢௣௧
𝜕𝛾 ൌ
𝜕𝐿𝑆ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧
𝜕𝛾 ሺ𝑇 െ 𝑡ሻ. (50) 
 
Since (49) is positive, so is (50), implying that an increase in the strength of the altruistic 
bequest motive delays retirement. Thus, we conclude with 
 
Remark 7. An increase in the strength of the altruistic bequest motive will cause parents to not 
only work more hours per week but also to work longer and retire later, as shown by equations 
(49) and (50). 
 
 
2.3. Case 2: Strategic or Exchange Bequest Motives 
 
In this subsection, we assume that parents leave a bequest to elicit care and/or attention from 
their children. This is the so-called strategic or exchange bequest motive discussed by Laitner 
and Ohlsson (2001, p. 211) and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985). Some questions arise 
immediately. Suppose a child took good care of her elderly parents by sacrificing time and 
resources. How can he/she be sure that her parents will reward him or her properly and will not 
renege on their implicit or explicit promise? By contrast, even if parents gave the promised 
reward to their child, the latter might still fail to carry out her duties as promised. After all, if 
intra-household gifts and exchanges are based on purely selfish motives to begin with, selfish 
individuals might consider breaking their promises whenever they felt like it.  
 
Real life is more complex, however. Even if it is in an individual’s self-interest to break an 
agreement, often a society develops social customs and rules to minimize such deviant behavior, 
and such social customs might be easier to enforce between members of one family (who tend 
to be bound by intra-household trust and affection) than between total strangers. Moreover, 
another way to ensure that both parents and children hold up their end of the bargain is for them 
to draw up and sign a legally enforceable contract (or at least an implicit or verbal contract).  
 
To proceed with our technical analysis simply, we need to specify a quid pro quo bequest/care 
function. Note that care to parents can take many forms. We assume that care takes the form 
of a time sacrifice on the part of children (e.g., when they spend time interacting with, and 
entertaining, their parents or running errands for them). Certainly, it is not necessary to assume 
that parents and children are expected to always spend time together as nothing prevents an 
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arrangement whereby, for example, a child paints her parent’s fence while the latter is at work 
or on vacation elsewhere, but to simplify the analysis, we assume in our model that care always 
takes the form of spending time with parents. Fundamentally, even though spending time with 
parents entails various opportunity costs, the reward is a bequest.  
 
Remark 8. Let us introduce the “care function” 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻ , where 𝒗  is the vector of 
functions, and assume that the care function is known and shaped by social customs and 
traditions. In line with the mathematical theory of optimal processes, let function 𝑧  be 
continuously differentiable in all of its arguments, none of which is a derivative. Assume that 0 ൑ 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻ ൏ 1  and that డ௭ሺ𝒗,௞ሺ்ሻ,௧ሻడ௞ሺ்ሻ ൐ 0 . Hence, we assume that a ceteris paribus 
increase in the bequest amount 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ increases the amount of care time the child spends with 
her parent.  
 
Note that time might enter function 𝑧 in the sense that, before some age, the expected care 
from one’s child might be minimal since the parent is presumably healthy and busy at work 
but that it might increase rapidly with time as the parent ages and children mature. Vector 𝒗 
might include, among other things, the child’s bargaining power and outside opportunities (that 
is, a child with better outside options would need to be promised a larger bequest to exert the 
same amount of care effort).  
 
For any given bequest amount, the parent expects her child to spend 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻ fraction of 
time with the parent. For example, consider a parent who promises to bequeath 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ ൌ$10,000. Suppose that, at a certain point in time, the parent enjoys nine hours of non-sleep 
time as leisure, while social customs require that, in this case, the child spend one hour with 
the parent (i.e., 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻ ൌ 1/9ሻ. Thus, the parent enjoys eight hours of leisure alone 
(away from the child) and one hour with the child. If the promised bequest amount increases 
to $20,000, the child would promise to spend, say, an hour and a half with the parent 
(𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻ ൌ 1/6) at time 𝑡. In this case, the parent enjoys seven and a half hours of leisure 
alone, and an hour and a half with the child.  
 
Let the lifetime utility function of the main decision-maker now be 
 
 
𝑈 ൌ න 𝑒ିఘ௧ሺ𝜙ଵln ሾ𝑐ሺ𝑡ሻሿ்
଴ ൅ 𝜙ଶ lnሾሺ1 െ 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻሻ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሿ൅ 𝜙ଷln ሾ𝑧ሺ𝒗, 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ, 𝑡ሻ𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻሿሻ𝑑𝑡. (1ʹ) 
            
Remark 9. We assume that the parent derives utility not only from leisure spent alone but also 
from leisure spent with her child. Note from (1ʹ) that when the parent leaves a larger bequest 
to her child (𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ is greater), she ends up buying more joint time with the child, and thus, by 
definition, spends less time alone. There is a trade-off between leisure enjoyed privately and 
leisure enjoyed jointly with the child. Note, moreover, that the parent does not derive any utility 
directly from the amount of her bequest or the consumption of her child because she is not 
altruistic. The parent’s bequest increases her utility only by increasing the amount of time she 
can spend with her child.  
 
Let us for clarity of exposition denote terminal capital stock 𝑘ሺ𝑇ሻ as 𝐵ீ . We now consider 
two separate assumptions about the care function, the first one being  
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Assumption 1. Care is given by 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝐵ீ , 𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑧଴𝐵ீ , where 𝑧଴ is positive yet small. 
 
Under Assumption 1, we consider a truly simplistic case, where the care level is simply 
proportional to the amount of the assets bequeathed to the child. This greatly facilitates the 
analysis, yet leads (as will be seen shortly) to one-sided results. Following the same steps as in 
subsection 2.2, we can re-state the analogue of (12) as the first-order necessary condition for 
leisure:  
 
 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻ𝑒
ିఘ௧𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻିଵ െ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0. (12ʹ) 
 
Hence, the analogues of (22) and (28) are  
 
 𝑎 ≡ 𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ൌ ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻ/ሺ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻሻ, (22ʹ) 
 
and 
 
 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ,  (28ʹ) 
 
for 𝑡 ∈ ሾ0,𝑇௥௘௧ሻ, respectively. We can thus rewrite (31) as   
 
 
𝑘ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ ≡ Λଶሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ
ൌ 𝑒௥ ೝ்೐೟ න ൬𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൬1 െ 𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ൰ೝ்೐೟଴
െ 𝜙ଵ𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ൰ 𝑒
ି௥௧𝑑𝑡. (31ʹʹ) 
 
Taking the limit of (31ʹʹ) as 𝑟 → 0, and equating the resulting expression with the analogue of 
(33) (where 𝜙ଶ is replaced with 𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻ, we solve for the retirement age as follows: 
 
 𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ ൌ െ𝑇𝜙ଵ ൅ ඥ𝐷ଷ/𝑤𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷ , (35ʹ)  
 
where 
  
 𝐷ଷ ≡ 𝑤𝑇ሺ2𝐵ீሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻଶ ൅ 𝑤𝑇𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻሻሻ. (36ʹ)  
 
Thus, under Assumption 1, the optimal bequest amount can be computed as in Case 1, this time 
rewriting (1ʹ) as (and recalling that 𝑟 ൌ 𝜌 ൌ 0ሻ 
 
 Δଵ ൅ Δଶ, (38ʹ) 
 
where  
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Δଵ
≡ 𝜙ଵ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଵ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯቉ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯଴ 𝑑𝑡
൅ 𝜙ଶ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ሺ1 െ 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝐵ீ , 𝑡ሻሻ቉ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯଴ 𝑑𝑡
൅ 𝜙ଷ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝐵ீ , 𝑡ሻ቉ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯଴ 𝑑𝑡, 
(39ʹ) 
 
Δଶ ≡ 𝜙ଵ න ln ቈ 𝜙ଵ𝑎൫𝑇௥௘௧ሺ𝐵ீሻ൯቉்ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯ 𝑑𝑡
൅ 𝜙ଶ න lnൣ൫1 െ 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝐵ீ , 𝑡ሻ൯൧்
ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯
𝑑𝑡
൅ 𝜙ଷ න lnሾ𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝐵ீ , 𝑡ሻሿ்
ೝ்೐೟൫஻ಸ൯
𝑑𝑡. 
(40ʹ) 
    
The optimal bequest amount is the amount that solves  
 
 𝐺 ≡ 𝜕Δଵ𝜕𝐵ீ ൅
𝜕Δଶ
𝜕𝐵ீ ൌ 0. (41ʹ) 
     
Unfortunately, even under Assumption 1, it is practically impossible to obtain 𝐵௢௣௧ீ  from (41ʹ) 
as an explicit function of the exogenous parameters. However, let (41ʹ) implicitly define the 
optimal bequest amount as a function of exogenous parameters. Consequently,  
 
 
𝜕𝐵௢௣௧ீ
𝜕𝜙ଷ ൌ െ
𝜕𝐺/𝜕𝜙ଷ
𝜕𝐺/𝜕𝐵௢௣௧ீ   (51) 
 
We verify that the right-hand side of (51) can be strictly positive around a range of points 
satisfying (41ʹ), implying that an increase in 𝜙ଷ might increase the optimal bequest amount. 
Using this fact and expression (35ʹ) (where we replace 𝐵ீ  with 𝐵௢௣௧ீ ), we can compute the 
comparative statics as follows:    
 
 
𝜕𝑇௥௘௧௢௣௧
𝜕𝜙ଷ
ൌ
െ𝑇𝜙ଵ൫𝑤𝑇ሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻ െ ඥ𝐷ସ൯ ൅ డ஻೚೛೟
ಸ
డథయ 𝑇ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻ
ଷ
ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻଶඥ𝐷ସ
, (50ʹ)  
 
where  
 
 𝐷ସ ≡ 𝑤𝑇ሺ2𝐵௢௣௧ீ ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻଶ ൅ 𝑤𝑇𝜙ଵሺ𝜙ଵ ൅ 2ሺ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሻሻሻ. (52)  
 
Even when (51) is positive, the sign of (50ʹ) is ambiguous. The same ambiguity is certainly 
observed when considering the number of hours worked during the working phase of life, 
which can be expressed as   
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 𝐿𝑆ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧ ≡ 1 െ 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ௢௣௧ ൌ 1 ൅ 𝑇௥௘௧௢௣௧ െ 𝑇𝑇 െ 𝑡  (46ʹ) 
 
Remark 10. Under Assumption 1, both the retirement age and hours worked move in the same 
direction in response to the rise in the strength of the exchange motive (see (46ʹ) and (50ʹ)).  
 
Intuitively, in the case of the quid pro quo strategic or exchange bequest motive, the decision-
making parent wants to extract as much care as possible from her child and for that reason she 
wants to leave as large a bequest as possible, which follows from equation (51). This 
encourages the parent to maximize lifetime income, which in turn requires the parent to supply 
more labor and to retire later. However, in order to be able to afford to leave a larger bequest, 
the parent might want to reduce private consumption, which can be compensated for by 
increasing the amount of leisure. Interestingly, equation (46ʹ) implies that if the strategic or 
exchange bequest motive induces the parent to increase her labor supply at the intensive margin, 
it will also induce her to retire later, and conversely. Thus, both the retirement age and number 
of hours worked move strictly in the same direction under Assumption 1. 
 
However, in reality, younger parents tend to have less need for care and attention from their 
children. Earlier in life, people are healthier and/or they find it harder to distract their children, 
who are at the early stages of their studies and career. More importantly, when parents are 
preoccupied with their work duties, they feel less lonely and less vulnerable. However, when 
they age and approach retirement age (and especially when they are less preoccupied with their 
formal work duties), their need for attention might increase. We thus propose an alternative 
specification for the care function, as given by the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 2. Care is given by 
 
 𝑧ሺ𝒗,𝐵ீ , 𝑡ሻ ൌ 𝑧ଵ𝐵ீ1 ൅ 𝑒௭మሺଵି௟ሺ௧ሻሻ, (53)  
 
where 𝑧ଵ and 𝑧ଶ are exogenous parameters.  
 
Thus, under the second assumption, the care function takes a logistic form (which is 
differentiable) and again rises with the amount of bequest left, 𝐵ீ . However, notice that during 
younger working ages (when 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ is small), the level of care is low. As the agent ages and 
thus approaches retirement (𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ → 1), the care level demanded from the child can rise rapidly. 
 
When care is given by (53), we can try to derive the analogue of (12ʹ), which now will become 
much more complicated.  
 
 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ ሺ𝜙ଶ𝑀ଵ ൅ 𝜙ଷ𝑀ଶሻ𝑒
ିఘ௧𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻିଵ െ 𝜇ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑡ሻ ൅ 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0, (12ʹʹ) 
 
where  
 
 𝑀ଵ ≡
1 െ ௭భ஻ಸଵା௘೥మ൫భష೗ሺ೟ሻ൯ 𝑀ଶ1 െ ௭భ஻ಸଵା௘೥మ൫భష೗ሺ೟ሻ൯ , (54) 
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 𝑀ଶ ≡ 1 ൅ 𝑒௭మ൫ଵି௟ሺ௧ሻ൯𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ𝑧ଶ1 ൅ 𝑒௭మ൫ଵି௟ሺ௧ሻ൯ . (55) 
 
We can see that, in Assumption 1, essentially 𝑀ଵ ൌ 𝑀ଶ ≡ 1. Next, we obtain 
 
 
𝑎 ≡ 𝑎ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻ
ൌ ሺ𝑧ଵ𝐵
ீሺ2 ൅ 𝑧ଶሻ െ 4ሻ𝜙ଶ ൅ 𝜙ଷሺ2 ൅ 𝑧ଶሻሺ𝑧ଵ𝐵ீ െ 2ሻ2𝑤𝜖ሺ𝑇௥௘௧ሻሺ𝑧ଵ𝐵ீ െ 2ሻ . (22ʹʹ) 
 
In what follows, it is important to solve (12ʹʹ) for leisure 𝑙ሺ𝑡ሻ when 𝜆ሺ𝑡ሻ ൌ 0 so that dynamic 
budget constraints can be used to pin down the optimal retirement age for a given terminal 
bequest level. Unfortunately, no closed-form solution exists in this case, which makes it 
extremely difficult to analytically infer the effect of a quid pro quo strategic or exchange 
bequest motive on the optimal retirement age and intensive labor supply. However, we have 
conducted a number of computations using various techniques as well as programmed 
simulations in GPOPS II (Patterson and Rao, 2014). Some interesting numerical results are 
provided in Table 1.  
 
We observe from the last column of Table 1 that parents with a stronger quid pro quo strategic 
or exchange bequest motive bequeath more. The second and third columns show that the 
optimal retirement age and hours worked move in opposite directions. Hence, we conclude 
with the following 
 
Remark 11. Under Assumption 2, it is possible that the stronger the quid pro quo strategic or 
exchange bequest motive, the larger the number of working hours and the earlier the retirement 
age, as shown by Table 1. 
 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
To summarize, our theoretical model has shown that different types of bequest motives have 
different impacts on the work behavior of households. Households with a stronger altruistic 
bequest motive unambiguously work more hours and retire later than households with a weaker 
bequest motive, but the impact of a strategic or exchange bequest motive on work behavior is 
theoretically ambiguous. Households with a stronger strategic or exchange bequest motive may 
work more or fewer hours and retire earlier or later than households with a weaker strategic or 
exchange bequest motive. 
 
It is entirely possible that some parents would expect much more care specifically during the 
retirement stage, while in general some parents would seek greater attention when they are less 
preoccupied with their current jobs. The flexibility of (53) allows us to generate various shapes 
for the care function. Under different parameterisations, the impact of a strategic or exchange 
bequest motive on the timing of retirement can still be ambiguous because, on the one hand, 
the parent wants to work longer to increase her lifetime income and the amount of her bequest 
in order to elicit more care from children, while on the other hand, she might want to retire 
earlier so she can start receiving care from her children sooner. Thus, when a strong strategic 
or exchange bequest motive is present, bequest motives have a complex impact on various 
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margins of work behavior. A careful empirical analysis is needed to shed light on these 
interactions, and this is precisely what we do in section 3.   
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis of the impact of bequest motives 
on the retirement behavior of households in Japan using micro data from the Preference 
Parameters Study of Osaka University. More specifically, in subsection 3.1, we derive testable 
hypotheses for a Japanese individual from our theoretical analysis; in subsection 3.2, we 
explain our data source and sample selection criteria; in subsection 3.3, we explain our 
estimation model and variable definitions; in subsection 3.4, we conduct a univariate analysis 
of individual work behavior under different bequest motives; and in subsection 3.5, we present 
and interpret our estimation results. 
  
 
3.1. Hypothesis Development 
 
In this subsection, we derive testable hypotheses from our theoretical analysis in section 2. Our 
theoretical model predicts that a parent with a stronger altruistic bequest motive will leave a 
larger bequest to her children and thus work more at both the intensive margin (see Remark 7 
on page 11). Thus, the testable hypothesis regarding the altruistic bequest motive is as follows: 
 
H1: The stronger an individual’s altruistic bequest motive, the larger the bequest she will leave 
to her children and the more she will work at both the intensive and extensive margins. 
 
By contrast, our theoretical model reveals that an individual with a strategic or exchange 
bequest motive confronts a dilemma. On the one hand, she wants to work more in order to be 
able to earn more, to leave a larger bequest to her children, and to elicit more care from them, 
but on the other hand, she wants to work less so that she can spend more time with (and receive 
more care from) her children. As a result, the net impact of this type of bequest motive on the 
amount of work at the intensive margin ( see Remark 11 on page 16) is ambiguous. However, 
since the social norm in Japan is to work hard, a Japanese individual may work more at the 
intensive margin (for example, work more hours per week) in order to earn more, to leave a 
larger bequest to her children, and to elicit more care from them, but retire earlier in order to 
be able to start receiving care from her children sooner. Thus, the testable hypothesis regarding 
the strategic or exchange bequest motive is as follows: 
 
H2: An individual with a strategic or exchange bequest motive will work more at the intensive 
margin but work less at the extensive margin (i.e., retire earlier). 
  
Hypothesis H1 is framed in terms of a continuous variable measuring the strength of the 
altruistic bequest motive, and H2 is framed in terms of a variable measuring how much value 
the parent places on spending time with her children, but as discussed in subsection 3.2 below, 
we only have discrete information on whether or not respondents have each type of bequest 
motive. Therefore, we test these hypotheses by analyzing how the work behavior of a 
respondent with an altruistic or strategic/exchange bequest motive compares with that of a 
respondent with no bequest motive whatsoever. 
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3.2. Data Source and Sample Selection Criteria 
 
In this subsection, we discuss the data source we use for our analysis and our sample selection 
criteria. We use micro data from the 2012 wave the Preference Parameters Study (Kurashi no 
Konomi to Manzokudo ni tsuite no Chousa) of Osaka University, a panel survey that was 
conducted in Japan and three other countries by the 21st Century Center of Excellence (COE) 
Program “Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments” and the Global 
COE Project “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics” of Osaka University. The 
survey was conducted annually during the 2003-13 period, but we chose to use data from the 
2012 wave because the question about bequest motives was not asked in every year and 2012 
was the most recent year for which this question was asked. The survey collects data on a 
nationwide random sample of both sexes, and the 2012 survey had 4588 respondents. 
 
The micro data from the 2012 wave is perfectly suited for our purposes because it collects 
detailed information on bequest motives, working hours, employment status (full-time vs. part-
time), planned retirement age, and all of the other variables that we need for our analysis. The 
complete survey instrument (questionnaire form) for the survey that we used for this analysis 
can be found at the following website:  
https://www.iser.osaka-.ac.jp/survey_data/doc/japan/questionnaire/english/2012Questionnair
eJAPAN.pdf  
 
Since the data source we used is a panel survey, it would have been preferable to do a panel 
analysis with fixed effects to control for individual heterogeneity, but unfortunately, we were 
not able to do so because some questions such as the ones pertaining to bequest motives were 
not asked in every wave. Fortunately, however, the survey we used collects information on a 
multitude of individual and household attributes, so we were able to control for such 
heterogeneity by including a large number of individual- and household-related covariates. 
 
The sample selection criteria we used are as follows: 
 
(1) We dropped all observations for which there were missing values for at least one of the 
variables used in the estimations. 
 
(2) We dropped all observations for which respondents are not currently working. 
 
(3) We dropped all observations for which respondents have no children because we were 
interested in examining whether respondents’ intention of leaving bequests to their children 
has any impact on their work behavior. 
 
(4) Since the value of the wage rate (WAGE) was unreasonably high or low in some cases due 
to the reported number of hours worked being unreasonably high or low, we dropped all 
observations that were in the top 1% or the bottom 1% of the distribution of WAGE.  
 
 
3.3. Estimation Model and Variable Definitions 
 
In this subsection, we describe the estimation model and the variables we use from the survey 
questions to test the hypotheses regarding the impact of bequest motives on individuals’ work 
behavior that we derived and discussed in the subsection 3.1. The question number in 
parentheses for each variable shows the survey question we used to construct that variable. 
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The estimation model for an individual i’s work behavior is as follows: 
 
𝑦௜ ൌ 𝛼଴ ൅ 𝛼௔𝑏𝑚௔௜ ൅ 𝛼௖𝑏𝑚௖௜ ൅ 𝛼௙𝑏𝑚௙௜ ൅ 𝛼௕𝑏𝑚௕௜ ൅ 𝛼௪𝑏𝑚௪௜ ൅ 𝛽ᇱ𝑥௜ ൅ 𝜀௜,          (56) 
 
where 𝑦௜ is the dependent variable that represents work-related outcomes for the intensive and 
extensive margins for individual i as defined below: 
 
Log(HRSPERWEEK) = the natural logarithm of the number of hours the respondent is working 
per week (a measure of the intensive margin, survey question B9), and 
 
Log(RETAGE) = the natural logarithm of the age at which the respondent plans to retire (a 
measure of the extensive margin, survey question B12). 
 
HRSPERWEEK pertains to the intensive margin (i.e., how much the respondent works during 
a given period of time, given that he or she works) whereas RETAGE pertains to the extensive 
margin (i.e., how long the respondent plans to work before retiring completely). We estimate 
a separate equation for each of these two dependent variables4. More precisely, we estimate the 
HRSPERWEEK and RETAGE equations using ordinary least squares. 
 
In addition, we use the probability of working full-time as an alternate measure of the intensive 
margin in our robustness checks to be presented later: 
 
FULLTIME = 1 if the respondent is working full-time and 0 if the respondent is working part-
time (survey question B13b) 
 
The explanatory variables pertaining to bequest motives in the estimation model above ሺ𝑏𝑚ሻ, 
which are of most interest for our purposes, are as follows:  
 
BEQMOTALT ሺ𝑏𝑚௔ሻ = 1 if the respondent is planning to leave a bequest to his or her 
child(ren) under any circumstances and 0 otherwise (survey question A31) 
 
BEQMOTCARE ሺ𝑏𝑚௖ሻ = 1 if the respondent is planning to leave a bequest to his or her 
child(ren) only if his or her child(ren) provide care (including nursing care) during old age and 
0 otherwise (survey question A31) 
 
BEQMOTFIN ൫𝑏𝑚௙൯ = 1 if the respondent is planning to leave a bequest to his or her 
child(ren) only if his or her child(ren) provide financial assistance during old age and 0 
otherwise (survey question A31) 
 
 
4 It is quite possible that the two work-related variables—number of hours worked per week and planned 
retirement age—are seemingly contemporaneously correlated. For example, an individual who plans to retire 
earlier may choose to work for more hours per week. This can make the error terms of the two work-related 
dependent variables (Log(RETAGE) and Log(HRSPERWEEK)) contemporaneously correlated. These equations 
can be estimated jointly using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. However, the joint (SUR) 
estimates and the single equation (ordinary least squares or OLS) estimates are identical when the right-hand side 
variables are the same. In our case, the right-hand side variables are the same in the two equations, and hence we 
estimate each equation separately. 
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BEQMOTBUS ሺ𝑏𝑚௕ሻ = 1 if the respondent is planning to leave a bequest to his or her 
child(ren) only if his or her children carry on the family business and 0 otherwise (survey 
question A31) 
 
BEQMOTWEAK ሺ𝑏𝑚௪ሻ = 1 if the respondent does not plan to make special efforts to leave 
a bequest to his or her child(ren) but will leave whatever is leftover and 0 otherwise (survey 
question A31) 
 
We regard BEQMOTALT as an altruistic bequest motive because the respondent does not 
impose any preconditions for leaving a bequest, and we regard BEQMOTCARE, 
BEQMOTFIN, and BEQMOTBUS as strategic or exchange bequest motives because the 
respondent imposes preconditions for leaving a bequest in all three cases. The default 
categories are respondents who do not plan to leave a bequest to their children under any 
circumstances and respondents who want to leave a bequest to their children but will not 
because they do not have the financial capacity to do so. Since we benchmark on individuals 
with no bequest motive5, the 𝛼′𝑠 measure the impact of each type of bequest motive on the 
individual’s work behavior. For instance, the sign and significance of 𝛼௔ and 𝛼௖ can shed 
light on the impact of altruistic and strategic or exchange bequest motives on work behavior as 
stated in H1 and H2 above, respectively. 
 
To control for the impact of other individual- and household-specific factors on the three work-
related outcomes, we include the following variables in vector x following, for example, Brown 
et. al (2015), Farhi et. at (2007), and Honig (1998), among others: 
 
Log(WAGE) = the natural logarithm of the respondent’s wage rate (hourly wage) (survey 
questions B9 and B18) 
 
In the data source we used, respondents have a choice between writing down his or her monthly 
salary or his or her hourly wage. For respondents who wrote down their hourly wage, we used 
this information as is, but for respondents who wrote down their monthly salary, we converted 
their monthly salary to an hourly wage by dividing their monthly salary by the number of hours 
worked per month. Since respondents are asked to report the number of hours they work per 
week, we converted it to the number of hours they work per month by multiplying it by 52, 
then dividing by 12 (or by multiplying by 4.33333). 
 
Since the work decisions of respondents will be affected by the earned income of other 
household members, we also include the respondent’s household earned income excluding the 
respondent’s own earned income: 
 
Log(OTHERINC) = the natural logarithm of non-respondent earned income, which was 
calculated as the respondent’s household earned income excluding the respondent’s own 
earned income (survey questions B19 and B36) 
 
 
5 “No bequest motive” includes the following three out of eight responses to the bequest motive question in the 
survey: “the repondent does not plan to leave a bequest to his or her child(ren) under any circumstances because 
doing so may reduce their will to work,” “the respondent does not plan to leave a bequest to his or her child(ren) 
under any circumstances because he or she wants to use his or her wealth himself or herself,” and “the respondent 
wants to leave a bequest to his or her chid(ren) but he or she won’t because he or she does not have the financial 
capacity to do so.”  
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BEQREC = 1 if the respondent has received a bequest (including real and financial assets) with 
a total value of 5,000,000 yen or more from his or her parents or parents-in-law in the past and 
0 otherwise (survey question A32) 
 
BEQEXP = 1 if the respondent expects to receive a bequest (including real and financial assets) 
with a total value of 5,000,000 yen or more from his or her parents or parents-in-law in the 
future and 0 otherwise (survey question A33) 
 
We include wealth-related variables such as WAGE, OTHERINC, BEQREC, and BEQEXP to 
eliminate the possibility that bequest motives are merely acting as a proxy for wealth, and we 
believe that BEQREC and BEQEXP are especially suitable for this purpose because they are 
largely exogenous, being the decision of the respondent’s parents. 
 
Furthermore, we include the following personal and work-related attributes of the respondent 
to eliminate the possibility of omitted variable(s) (endogeniety) bias that can bias the bequest-
work relationship due to the model’s errors (𝜀௜) being correlated with bequest motives6: 
 
MALE = 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if the respondent is female (survey question B1) 
 
MARRIED = 1 if the respondent is married or cohabiting with a partner and 0 if the respondent 
is never married, divorced, widowed, or separated and in the process of getting divorced 
(survey question B2) 
 
Log(AGE) = the natural logarithm of the respondent’s current age (survey question B4)  
 
HEALTH = the respondent’s health status on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being the highest) (survey 
question B51) 
 
WORRY = the extent to which the respondent is worried about his or her life after age 65 
(future life in the case of respondents who are 65 or older) on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being 
the highest) (survey question A1) 
 
WORK = the extent to which the respondent feels that “work is something to live for” on a 
scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being the highest) (survey question A1) 
 
WORKSAT = the extent to which the respondent is satisfied with work on a scale of 1 to 5 
(with 5 being the highest) (survey question B18) 
 
SALWKR = 1 if the respondent is a salaried worker and 0 if the respondent is self-employed 
or a family worker (survey question B13a) 
 
PENSION = the proportion of the living expenses after the retirement of the respondent and 
his or her spouse (if any) that the respondent expects to be able to cover using public pension 
benefits (in percent) (survey question B42) 
 
NUMCHILDREN = the number of children the respondent has (survey question B15) 
 
 
6 For example, omitting MALE may cause 𝜀௜ to be correlated with bequest motives (𝑏𝑚) since males are the 
main contributor to household wealth in Japan. 
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GAMBLE = 1 if the respondent gambles at least several times a year and 0 otherwise (included 
as a proxy for the degree of risk aversion) (survey question B57) 
 
We believe that our estimates are free from reverse relationship (endogeneity) bias—a bias 
arising from the fact that the respondent works hard simply because he/she enjoys working, 
that he/she ends up being able to accumulate more wealth than he/she can use himself/herself 
because he/she works harder, and that this makes it easier for him//her to leave a bequest--
because a reverse relationship is more likely to be observed for older workers (who are more 
likely to have accumulated a significant amount of wealth) whereas our results are driven by 
younger workers (as we show later). Moreover, we include WORK and WORKSAT (both of 
which are presumably fundamental or exogenous variables) to eliminate the possibility of 
reverse relationship bias. Note, finally, that, even if including WORK and WORKSAT is not 
sufficient to eliminate reverse relationship bias, the survey we used lists five types of bequest 
motives (BEQMOTALT, BEQMOTCARE, BEQMOTFIN, BEQMOTBUS, and 
BEQMOTWEAK), and respondents who accumulate more wealth than they can use 
themselves because they enjoy working will presumably be more likely to have a weak 
(unintended) bequest motive (BEQMOTWEAK) rather than an altruistic bequest motive 
(BEQMOTALT) or a strategic or exchange bequest motive for care (BEQMOTCARE). For all 
of these reasons, reverse relationship bias is unlikely to be applicable in the case of our main 
variables of interest.7   
 
 
3.4. Univariate Analysis 
 
In this subsection, we conduct a univariate analysis of the variables relating to work behavior 
and bequest motives. As can be seen from Table 2, the mean values of the three work-related 
outcomes are as follows: 59.4% of the sample works full-time, the average number of hours 
worked per week is 41.3, and the average planned retirement age is 64.7 years. The average 
planned retirement age is reasonable because, in Japan, the mandatory retirement age (and the 
age at which workers can start receiving public pension benefits) are in the process of being 
raised from 60 to 65.  
 
As for bequest motives, 29.4% of the sample has an altruistic bequest motive, 3.0% of the 
sample has a strategic or exchange bequest motive pertaining to providing care to parents, 0.8% 
of the sample has a strategic or exchange bequest motive pertaining to providing financial 
assistance to parents, 0.8% of the sample has a strategic or exchange bequest motive pertaining 
to carrying on the family business, 47.3% of the sample has a weak bequest motive, and 18.7% 
of the sample has no bequest motive at all.  
 
Among the strategic or exchange bequest motives, we confine our discussion to the motive 
pertaining to providing care to parents because this is the motive that is closest in spirit to our 
theoretical model and because the shares of the other strategic or exchange bequest motives are 
 
7 Moreover, respondents who worked for many hours per week and accumulated considerable wealth as a result 
may or may not choose to leave a bequest. For example, Andrew Carnegie strongly opposed leaving inheritances 
to one's children even though he worked hard and became one of the world's wealthiest men because he felt that 
it would weaken their will to work and to contribute to society (see Carnegie, 1962; this motive corresponds to 
the first response in footnote 5). Indeed, he set an example by giving away all of his massive wealth to charitable 
causes and leaving nothing to his daughter, and there are many other wealthy individuals who behave similarly. 
Thus, we believe that bequest decisions arise from deep parameters that are exogenous and that whether or not 
one has a bequest motive is independent of one’s work effort or wealth level. 
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less than 1% of the sample. Moreover, the weak bequest motive is not related to H1 and H2 so 
we do not discuss the results for this motive either although we include all bequest motives in 
the estimation model so we can estimate the partial effects 𝛼௔ and 𝛼௖ of the bequest motives 
in which we are interested, i.e., BEQMOTALT ሺ𝑏𝑚௔ሻ and BEQMOTCARE ሺ𝑏𝑚௖ሻ.    
 
Before turning to our regression analysis, we present the results of our univariate analysis of 
the bequest-work relationship (as hypothesized in H1 and H2 ) in Table 3 with the average 
values of the two work-related outcomes being broken down by bequest motive. We can see 
from this table that the outcome variables differ substantially by bequest motive in systematic 
ways. For example, respondents with an altruistic bequest motive (those who plan to leave a 
bequest to their children under any circumstances) show higher values of both outcome 
variables than other respondents: i.e., they work more hours per week and plan to retire later. 
By contrast, respondents with a strategic or exchange bequest motive for care (those who plan 
to leave a bequest to their children only if they provide care (including nursing care) during old 
age) work more hours per week but plan to retire earlier than other respondents.  
 
Our theoretical model showed that those with an altruistic bequest motive work more and retire 
later than others but that those with a strategic or exchange bequest motive tend to work more 
but retire earlier than others. Thus, our preliminary findings based on univariate analysis are 
fully consistent with H1 and H2 regarding the bequest-work relationship. However, we need 
to see whether these findings hold even after we control for the impact of individual- and 
household-specific factors on the two work-related outcomes using regression analysis, which 
is what we do in the next subsection. 
 
 
3.5. Estimation Results and Empirical Findings 
 
In this subsection, we present and discuss the estimation results of our econometric model in 
equation (56) for the work behavior of individuals in Japan with emphasis on the impact of the 
bequest motives of interest ሺ𝛼௔,𝛼௖ሻ thereon. More specifically, we present and discuss the 
estimation results for the two (dependent) variables—one for work at the intensive margin, i.e., 
the number of hours worked per week and the other for work at the extensive margin, i.e., the 
planned retirement age. Our interest in individual- and household-specific factors (𝑥ሻ  is 
limited to controlling for their impact on individuals' work behavior. 
 
 
3.5.1. The bequest-work relationship 
 
We present the estimation results for the bequest-work relationship in Tables 4-5. Table 4 
shows the results for the number of hours worked per week, while Table 5 shows the results 
for the planned retirement age, both estimated using ordinary least squares.  
 
We show estimation results for the full sample, for the married sample, for the male sample, 
and for the married male sample for all ages and for those aged 40 or older because work 
behavior tends to differ by marital status, gender, and age and because this may help us to find 
the subsample, if any, that drives the bequest-work relationship in the full-sample. As discussed 
earlier, we are interested primarily in the altruistic bequest motive and the strategic or exchange 
bequest motive for care, and we present these results under “bequest motives of interest” in 
Tables 4-5.   
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We find that 𝛼௔ is positive and statistically significant at the 10% levels for the full sample 
(see the column marked “Both sexes, all ages”) in log(HRSPERWEEK) regression, as shown 
in Table 4. Thus, as in the case of our univariate analysis, the number of working hours per 
week of respondents with an altruistic bequest motive (BEQMOTALT) is significantly higher 
than that of respondents without any bequest motive. However, we do not find similar support 
for respondents’ planned retirement age as 𝛼௔  is statistically insignificant in the 
log(RETAGE) regression, as shown in Table 5. The fact that more significant results are 
obtained for all ages than for the 40-plus sample in the log(HRSPERWEEK) regression 
suggests that the significant altruistic bequest-work relationship for the full sample appears to 
be driven by respondents who are less than 40 years old, which in turn suggests that altruistic 
respondents modify their work behavior at a relatively early age. Thus, we find partial support 
for H1 (i.e., an altruistic bequest-work relationship) in the case of Japan. 
 
Our empirical results pertaining to H2 are consistent with theoretical predictions as well as 
with the univariate analysis discussed in subsection 3.4 for both work-related outcomes. We 
find that 𝛼௖ , which measures the strength of the strategic or exchange bequest-work 
relationship, is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the full sample (see the 
column marked “Both sexes, all ages”), as shown in Table 4, and negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the log(RETAGE) regression, as shown in Table 5. These results 
imply that the number of hours worked per week of respondents who plan to leave a bequest 
only if their children provide care (including nursing care) during old age (BEQMOTCARE) 
is significantly higher but that their planned retirement age is significantly lower than that of 
respondents without any bequest motive. These results provide strong support for H2.  
 
Looking at the results for various subsamples, the strategic or exchange bequest-work 
relationship is stronger for the male sample than for both sexes in the log(HRSPERWEEK) 
regressions (in fact, 𝛼௖ is statistically significant at the 1% level in the male sample of all 
ages). This suggests that the strategic or exchange bequest motive affects the number of hours 
worked per week of male respondents more than that of female respondents and that male 
respondents are the ones driving the results for the full sample. 
 
Moreover, the strategic or exchange bequest-work relationship is stronger for the married male 
sample than for the full male sample in the log(RETAGE) regression. This suggests that the 
strategic or exchange bequest motive affects the planned retirement age of married males more 
than it affects that of unmarried males, which suggests that it is married males who are driving 
the results for the full sample (our unreported results for female respondents provide further 
support for this claim). A possible explanation for this finding is that married males have a 
greater demand for care from their children because they as well as their wives are potential 
care recipients8. 
 
Our interpretation of the strategic or exchange bequest-work relationship is that respondents 
with a strategic or exchange bequest motive tend to work more intensively than others before 
they retire so that they can earn more, leave a larger bequest to their children, and elicit more 
care from them after they retire but that they tend to retire earlier than others so that they can 
start receiving care from their children sooner. 
 
8  Our unreported results indicate that the strategic or exchange bequest-work relationship is supported for 
respondents aged less than 50 years old. In other words, the bequest-work relationship is driven by relatively 
young married couples in general and young married males in particular. This makes sense since planning for 
bequests and retirement is an issue for young working couples with children. 
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Comparing our results for the altruistic and strategic/exchange bequest motives, 𝛼௖ is more 
than twice as large as 𝛼௔ in almost all cases, as can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, implying 
that the strategic or exchange bequest motive (whereby parents leave a bequest to their children 
in exchange for receiving care) has a much greater impact on their employment status and 
working hours than the altruistic bequest motive (whereby parents give a unilateral transfer to 
their children without receiving anything in return). 
 
 
3.5.2. The impact of other factors on work behavior 
 
In this subsection, we discuss our findings relating to the other factors that can affect the various 
work-related outcomes considered in the estimation model. We included the sixteen control 
variables discussed in subsection 3.2, plus the natural logarithm of wage squared to account for 
possible non-linearity in the impact of wages. We provide explanations of the factors that are 
relevant and important in the Japanese context.  
 
3.5.2.1. Wages and other income 
 
The net effect of the respondent’s wage rate (WAGE) on the number of hours worked per week 
is positive. More specifically, the marginal effect of an increase in the wage rate is 
ങ೤
೤
ങೢ
ೢ
ൌ 𝛽ଵ ൅2𝛽ଶ, where 𝑤 is the wage rate, which equals 1.097 ൅ 2 ൈ ሺെ0.081ሻ ൌ 0.935 for the full 
sample in the log(HRSPERWEEK) regression (see the column marked “Both sexes, all ages” 
in Table 5). The effect seems to be intuitively reasonable as it implies that a one percentage 
point increase in the wage rate increases the number of hours worked per week by less than 
one percentage point. 
 
By contrast, the respondent’s wage rate has a consistently negative and statistically significant 
impact on the planned retirement age, as shown in Table 6, presumably because leisure is a 
luxury good, the demand for which increases (causing a decline in labor supply) as income 
increases. More specifically, the marginal effect of an increase in the wage rate is െ0.161 ൅2 ൈ ሺ0.01ሻ ൌ െ0.141 for the full sample in the log(RETAGE) regression (see the column 
marked “Both sexes, all ages” in Table 6).  
 
As expected, an addition to non-respondent earned income (OTHERINC) induces respondents 
to retire earlier, again presumably reflecting the fact that leisure is a luxury good. 
 
3.5.2.2. Bequest receipts and bequest expectations 
 
Bequest receipts (BEQREC) and bequest expectations (BEQEXP), both of which are a measure 
of nonwage income, should have qualitatively similar impacts as non-respondent earned 
income (OTHERINC) on individual work behavior, but the impact of BEQREC is never 
statistically significant, while BEQEXP has a negative and statistically significant impact in 
the log(RETAGE) regression. The latter finding implies that respondents expecting to receive 
bequests plan to retire earlier than respondents without such expectations, as expected. 
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3.5.2.3. Gender, age, and marital status  
 
The impact of gender (MALE) is significantly positive as expected, reflecting the social norm 
in Japan that males are expected to work more than females both at the intensive and extensive 
margins. 
 
As for the impact of marital status (MARRIED), being married shortens working time 
significantly at both the intensive and extensive margins in the full sample but does not have a 
significant impact on working time in the male sample. Our finding for the male sample may 
arise because the desire of married males to spend time with their wives and children, which 
would tend to reduce their working time, is offset by the social norm in Japan that wives bear 
a disproportionate share of the burden of housework and childrearing, which would enable 
married males to increase their working time. 
 
The respondent’s age (AGE) has a negative and statistically significant impact on the number 
of hours worked per week but has a positive and statistically significant impact on the planned 
retirement age. The former finding is plausible because mental and/or physical fatigue 
presumably increases with age, reducing how much the respondent can work at the intensive 
margin. The latter finding suggests that respondents postpone retirement as they get older, 
perhaps because they gradually realize that they do not have enough resources to finance their 
living expenses during retirement.  
 
3.5.2.4. Work importance, work satisfaction, and occupation type 
 
The importance of work (WORK) generally has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the number of hours worked per week and on the planned retirement age, meaning that 
respondents for whom work is more important work more and work longer, which is as one 
might expect. 
 
As expected, work satisfaction (WORKSAT) has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the extensive margin (i.e., the planned retirement age), meaning that respondents who are 
satisfied with work, work longer but this is not the case at the intensive margin. 
  
As for the impact of occupation type (SALWKR), salaried workers plan to retire earlier than 
the self-employed. This result is as one might expect because salaried workers face a mandatory 
retirement age, whereas the self-employed do not, and because the pension benefits of salaried 
workers are higher than those of the self-employed in Japan. 
 
3.5.2.5. Public pension benefits 
 
The generosity of public pension benefits (PENSION) has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the number of hours worked per week and on the planned retirement age 
(Honig (1998) reports similar results for a sample of 590 white married women in the United 
States). This is evidence of the induced retirement effect identified by Feldstein (1974). 
 
3.5.2.6. Number of children 
 
As for the impact of the number of children (NUMCHILDREN), it does not have a significant 
impact on either work-related outcome.  
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3.5.2.7. Risk preference, health status, and worry about retirement 
 
As for the impact of the degree of risk aversion (GAMBLE), risk-loving respondents who like 
to gamble do not differ significantly from other respondents for the number of hours worked 
per week or for their planned retirement age in the case of both sexes. Farhi and Panageas 
(2007) find that individuals who wish to retire earlier are less risk-averse and invest more in 
the stock market, but our finding that there is not a statistically significant association between 
the degree of risk aversion and the timing of retirement implies that Farhi and Panageas’s 
(2007) finding does not apply in the case of Japan. However, this result might be due to the 
weak proxy we use for risk aversion.  
 
The health status (HEALTH) of males delays their planned retirement age, which is in line 
with the findings of Brown et al. (2015), who report that Croatian retirees in good health are 
more likely to opt for a deferred retirement package.  
 
Finally, worry about life after 65 (WORRY) does not have a statistically significant impact on 
either work-related outcome. 
 
 
3.6. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we discuss the large number of robustness checks that we conducted for our 
empirical analysis. First, we used the probability of working full-time as an alternative measure 
of the intensive margin. The model is estimated using the probit method. The results for the 
marginal effects are shown in Table 6, and as can be seen from this table, the results are 
generally very similar to those for the number of hours worked per week, especially for the 
bequest motive-related variables that are of the most interest to us. Even though working full-
time is a weak proxy for work at the intensive margin because it is not a continuous variable, 
it shows that individuals with an altruistic or strategic/exchange bequest motive work more 
than individuals with no bequest motive at all, as we found when we used the number of hours 
worked per week. 
 
We also conducted a battery of other robustness checks, but our main empirical results of the 
bequest-work relationship remained unchanged and significant. For example, we restricted our 
sample to households with at least one child since bequest allocation is a parent-child issue. 
We also added a long list of individual- and household-specific controls to eliminate the 
endogeneity bias arising from omitted variable(s). Moreover, our results are free from reverse 
relationship bias, as discussed earlier. We also eliminated the possibility that bequest motives 
are merely acting as a proxy for wealth by including a large number of wealth-related variables 
such as WAGE, WAGEଶ, OTHERINC, BEQREC, and BEQEXP. 
 
 
4．Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we conducted a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of bequest 
motives on the work and retirement behavior of households in Japan using micro data from the 
Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University to shed light on whether or not households 
planning to leave bequests work more or work longer than those not planning to leave bequests. 
Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical model and show that respondents 
with an altruistic or strategic/exchange bequest motive work more at the intensive margin than 
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those without any bequest motive but that respondents with a strategic or exchange bequest 
motive work less at the extensive margin (i.e., retire earlier) than those without any bequest 
motive. Our findings for the strategic or exchange bequest motive are entirely plausible because 
respondents with such a motive may want to work harder than others before they retire so that 
they can earn more, leave a larger bequest to their children, and elicit more care from them but 
that they may want to retire earlier than others so that they can start receiving care for 
themselves and their spouses from their children sooner. Moreover, the altruistic bequest-work 
relationship in Japan is driven by relatively young respondents (those aged less than 40 years), 
which suggests that altruistic respondents decide their work behavior at a relatively young age. 
Interestingly, the strategic or exchange bequest-work relationship is driven primarily by the 
married male sample. A possible explanation for this finding is that married males have a 
greater demand for care from their children because they as well as their wives are potential 
care recipients. 
 
We employ a battery of robustness checks to show that our empirical findings concerning the 
bequest-work relationship are highly robust, remaining significant and consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical model even when (i) we use a dummy variable for full-time work 
in lieu of the number of hours worked per week as a measure of the intensive margin, (ii) we 
include a large number of control variables relating to individual- and household-specific 
factors to address the endogeneity bias arising from omitted variable(s), (iii) we ensure that the 
bequest-work relationship is free from reverse relationship bias, and (iv) we add a number of 
proxies for wealth to eliminate the possibility that bequest motives are merely acting as a proxy 
for wealth. 
 
Our findings have important implications for policymakers in Japan. Since individual work 
behavior can be altered by changing inheritance taxes, it is very important for policymakers to 
realize that the bequest-work relationship exists but that it varies by bequest motive in Japan. 
In the case of a strategic or exchange bequest motive, which affects parents’ work behavior as 
well as retirement decision, inheritance tax policy should be set taking account both the 
increased work effort at the intensive margin as well as the induced retirement effect of this 
motive. On one hand, a lower inheritance tax will encourage parents to work more before 
retirement so they can leave a larger bequest, and this will contribute to higher economic 
growth. However, a lower inheritance tax may also lead some parents to retire earlier than 
otherwise so that they can start receiving care sooner, meaning that labor supply may not 
increase, on balance, as a result of a reduction in the inheritance tax. In the case of the altruistic 
bequest motive, by contrast, there does not seem to be any need to worry about the induced 
retirement effect, meaning that lowering inheritance taxes will unambiguously increase work 
efforts by encouraging individuals to leave bequests. Since the rapid ageing of Japan’s 
population is projected to produce severe shortages of workers in the coming years, reforming 
inheritance taxes and other government policies relating to bequests may be an effective way 
of encouraging people to work more, if implemented carefully.  
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Table 1 
Numerical results for the case of strategic or exchange bequest motives 
These results correspond to the following parameters of the model. The wage rate (𝑤) is 1, the age of death (𝑇 ൅25) is 80, the weight on personal consumption (𝜑ଵ) is 0.10, the weight on personal leisure (𝜑ଶ) is 0.20, and the 
care function parameters 𝑧ଵ and 𝑧ଶ are equal to 0.20, and 5.00, respectively.    
Strength of exchange 
motive (𝜙ଷ) 
Age of 
retirement 
Average number of hours worked 
per week 
Optimal 
bequest 
0.40 60.55 40.66 5.02 
0.50 60.10 40.77 5.33 
0.60 59.53 41.24 5.56 
0.70 59.30 41.42 5.73 
0.80 58.93 41.84 5.88 
0.90 58.65 42.20 6.00 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation model.  
 This table shows summary statistics for Japanese households based on micro data from the 2012 wave of the Preference Parameters 
Study (Kurashi no Konomi to Manzokudo nit suite no Chousa) of Osaka University. We used the natural logarithm (log( )) of all 
continuous variables in the estimation model. Variables and relevant considerations are discussed in section 3. 
  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum No. of obs. 
Dependent variables 
HRSPERWEEK 41.347 15.151 40 1 105 1574 
log(HRSPERWEEK) 3.632 0.480 3.689 0 4.654 1574 
RETAGE 64.694 5.402 65 35 90 1574 
log(RETAGE) 4.166 0.084 4.174 3.555 4.500 1574 
FULLTIME 0.594 0.491 1 0 1 1574 
Explanatory variables pertaining to bequest motives 
BEQMOTALT 0.294 0.456 0 0 1 1574 
BEQMOTCARE 0.030 0.172 0 0 1 1574 
BEQMOTFIN 0.008 0.087 0 0 1 1574 
BEQMOTBUS 0.008 0.091 0 0 1 1574 
BEQMOTWEAK 0.473 0.499 0 0 1 1574 
BEQMOTNONE 0.187 0.390 0 0 1 1574 
Other explanatory variables 
WAGE 1521.143 856.469 1296.154 346.154 6527.473 1574 
log(WAGE) 7.196 0.501 7.167 5.847 8.784 1574 
OTHERINC 10.045 6.628 13.5 0 24.2 1574 
log(OTHERINC+1） 2.053 1.004 2.674 0 3.227 1574 
BEQREC 0.341 0.474 0 0 1 1574 
BEQEXP 0.267 0.443 0 0 1 1574 
MALE 0.571 0.495 1 0 1 1574 
MARRIED 0.922 0.267 1 0 1 1574 
AGE 51.230 9.852 51 26 79 1574 
log(AGE) 3.917 0.199 3.932 3.258 4.369 1574 
HEALTH 3.475 0.917 3 1 5 1574 
WORRY 3.494 1.068 4 1 5 1574 
WORK 3.576 0.858 4 1 5 1574 
WORKSAT 3.283 0.944 3 1 5 1574 
SALWKR 0.838 0.369 1 0 1 1574 
PENSION 48.221 24.424 55 5 95 1574 
NUMCHILDREN 2.165 0.431 2 1 5 1574 
GAMBLE 0.431 0.495 0 0 1 1574 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3  
Distribution of work-related outcomes by bequest motive. 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, and the number of observations of the work-related outcomes for each bequest motive. The full 
sample consists of 1574 observations. We classify BEQMOTALT as an altruistic bequest motive, and BEQMOTCARE, BEQMOTFIN and 
BEQMOTBUS as strategic or exchange bequest motives as explained in subsection 3.2. FULLTIME is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
for respondents who work full-time and a value of zero for respondents who work part-time, HRSPERWEEK is the number of hours the respondent 
works per week, and RETAGE is the respondent’s planned retirement age. See the notes to Table 2 and subsection 3.4 for further details. 
    
  Full sample BEQMOTALT BEQMOTCARE BEQMOTFIN BEQMOTBUS BEQMOTWEAK BEQMOTNONE 
 HRSPERWEEK  
Mean  41.3 44.0 42.9 39.4 41.8 39.9 40.6 
Std. dev.  15.2 14.5 14.5 11.1 19.4 14.6 16.9 
# of obs.  1574 463 48 12 13 744 294 
 RETAGE  
Mean  64.7 64.8 64.3 63.3 68.5 64.6 64.7 
Std. dev.  5.4 5.5 5.3 5.8 8.5 5.5 4.9 
# of obs.  1574 463 48 12 13 744 294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  
The bequest-work relationship for the number of hours worked per week 
 The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the respondent’s number of hours worked per week. The bequest motives of interest are the altruistic 
bequest motive (BEQMOTALT) and the strategic or exchange bequest motive for care (BEQMOTCARE), and the table shows the impact of these 
variables after controlling for the effect of other bequest motives and explanatory variables on the planned retirement age. The model described in 
subsection 3.2 is estimated by ordinary least squares and the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The p-values for the significance of the 
coefficients are expressed as *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 and ***p < 0. The model’s estimates are shown in the eight columns 2—9 and vary due to variations 
in the sample, which are based on various combinations of gender, marital status, and/or age. For example, the second column shows the estimates for 
the full sample, while the third shows the estimates for individuals of both sexes aged 40 years or above.  
  
 Dependent variable: log(HRSPERWEEK) 
Explanatory variable Both sexes, all ages 
Both sexes, 
age>=40 
Both sexes, 
married, all 
ages 
Both sexes, 
married, 
age>=40 
Males,    
all ages 
Males, 
age>=40 
Married 
males, all 
ages 
Married 
males, 
age>=40 
Bequest motives of interest 
BEQMOTALT 0.053* 0.039 0.048 0.034 0.009 0.021 0.010  0.021 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) 
BEQMOTCARE 0.121** 0.099* 0.141*** 0.121** 0.096*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.117*** 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.053) (0.057) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
Other bequest motives 
BEQMOTFIN -0.063 -0.102 -0.111 -0.170  -0.240** -0.240* -0.239** -0.242* 
 (0.105) (0.117) (0.121) (0.137) (0.120) (0.131) (0.119) (0.130) 
BEQMOTBUS 0.040  0.044 0.027 0.031 -0.210  -0.177 -0.208 -0.175 
 (0.173) (0.169) (0.175) (0.171) (0.246) (0.240) (0.247) (0.240) 
BEQMOTWEAK 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.020  -0.016 -0.008 -0.011 -0.003 
  (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
Other explanatory variables 
log(WAGE) 1.097* 0.719 1.034* 0.681 0.432 0.504 0.559 0.649 
 (0.597) (0.590) (0.604) (0.598) (0.641) (0.665) (0.675) (0.704) logሺWAGEଶሻ -0.081** -0.055 -0.076* -0.052 -0.036 -0.041 -0.045 -0.051 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) 
log(OTHERINC) -0.009 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 0.005 0.010  0.002 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
BEQREC -0.012 -0.005 -0.015 -0.007 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
BEQEXP 0.017 -0.010  0.011 -0.015 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.0005 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
MALE 0.530*** 0.520*** 0.536*** 0.526***     
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)     
MARRIED -0.161*** -0.156***  
 -0.009 0.002   
 (0.042) (0.045)  
 (0.044) (0.046)   
log(AGE) -0.285*** -0.570*** -0.270*** -0.542*** -0.448*** -0.672*** -0.449*** -0.676*** 
 (0.065) (0.086) (0.067) (0.088) (0.054) (0.079) (0.055) (0.080) 
HEALTH 0.003 0.011 0.0003 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010  0.009 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
WORRY -0.002 -0.009 -0.011 -0.018 0.011 0.008 0.010  0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
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WORK 0.025* 0.028** 0.021 0.024* 0.017 0.018 0.020* 0.022* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
WORKSAT -0.019 -0.020  -0.014 -0.015 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
SALWKR 0.058 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.007*** -0.005 0.010  -0.002 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) 
PENSION -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
NUMCHILDREN -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 -0.004 0.015 0.010  0.018 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
GAMBLE -0.009 -0.013 -0.003 -0.009 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
Constant 0.916 3.439 0.909 3.287 4.265* 4.901** 3.781 4.366* 
  (2.209) (2.174) (2.251) (2.233) (2.369) (2.483) (2.502) (2.640) 
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.283 0.292 0.290  0.161 0.177 0.163 0.179 
# of observations 1,574 1,369 1,452 1,263 899 792 868 763 
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Table 5 
The bequest-work relationship for the planned retirement age 
 The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the respondent’s planned retirement age. The bequest motives of interest are the altruistic bequest 
motive (BEQMOTALT) and the strategic or exchange bequest motive for care (BEQMOTCARE), and the table shows the impact of these variables 
after controlling for the effect of other bequest motives and explanatory variables on the planned retirement age. The model described in subsection 3.2 
is estimated by ordinary least squares and the standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are 
expressed as *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 and ***p < 0. The model’s estimates are shown in the eight columns 2—9 and vary due to variations in the sample, 
which are based on various combinations of gender, marital status, and/or age. For example, the second column shows the estimates for the full sample, 
while the third shows the estimates for individuals of both sexes aged 40 years or above.    
  
 Dependent variable: log(RETAGE) 
Explanatory variable 
Both 
sexes, all 
ages 
Both 
sexes, 
age>=40 
Both 
sexes, 
married, 
all ages 
Both 
sexes, 
married, 
age>=40 
Males,   
all ages 
Males, 
age>=40 
Married 
males, all 
ages 
Married 
males, 
age>=40 
Bequest motives of interest 
BEQMOTALT -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
BEQMOTCARE -0.022** -0.022** -0.026** -0.027** -0.017 -0.019 -0.023** -0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Other bequest motives 
BEQMOTFIN -0.044** -0.018 -0.050** -0.020  -0.026 -0.015 -0.028 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) 
BEQMOTBUS 0.012 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.037 0.028 0.035 0.027 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
BEQMOTWEAK -0.009* -0.013*** -0.009* -0.013** -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Other explanatory variables 
log(WAGE) -0.161** -0.153* -0.180** -0.169** -0.319*** -0.284*** -0.366*** -0.338*** 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.082) (0.083) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.106) logሺWAGEଶሻ 0.010* 0.010* 0.012** 0.011* 0.020*** 0.018** 0.024*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
log(OTHERINC) -0.004** -0.003* -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
BEQREC 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
BEQEXP -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.009* -0.007 -0.010** -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
MALE 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.049***     
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)     
MARRIED -0.030*** -0.022***  
 -0.006 -0.004   
 (0.007) (0.007)  
 (0.015) (0.016)   
log(AGE) 0.119*** 0.163*** 0.121*** 0.159*** 0.111*** 0.140*** 0.113*** 0.140*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
HEALTH 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.005* 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
WORRY -0.0001 -0.002 0.0005 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.0002 -0.002 
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 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
WORK 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006** 0.007** 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
WORKSAT 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SALWKR -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.075*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
PENSION -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
NUMCHILDREN 0.001 0.0005 0.001 -0.0005 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
GAMBLE -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 4.339*** 4.131*** 4.362*** 4.182*** 5.003*** 4.764*** 5.172*** 4.971*** 
  (0.299) (0.295) (0.311) (0.314) (0.415) (0.417) (0.405) (0.410) 
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.366 0.323 0.373 0.305 0.344 0.319 0.364 
# of observations 1,574 1,369 1,452 1,263 899 792 868 763 
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Table 6 
The bequest-work relationship for employment status (full-time vs. part-time) 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether or not the respondent works full-time. The bequest motives of interest are the altruistic 
bequest motive (BEQMOTALT) and the strategic or exchange bequest motive for care (BEQMOTCARE), and the table shows the impact of these 
variables after controlling for the effect of other bequest motives and explanatory variables on the planned retirement age. The model described in 
subsection 3.2 is estimated by the probit method, the coefficients and the p-values are for (average) marginal effects, and the standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are expressed as *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 and ***p < 0. The model’s estimates 
are shown in the eight columns 2—9 and vary due to variations in the sample, which are based on various combinations of gender, marital status, and/or 
age. For example, the second column shows the estimates for the full sample, while the third shows the estimates for individuals of both sexes aged 40 
years or above.  
  
 Dependent variable: FULLTIME (full-time dummy) 
Explanatory 
variable 
Both 
sexes, all 
ages 
Both sexes, 
age>=40 
Both sexes, 
married, all 
ages 
Both sexes, 
married, 
age>=40 
Males,    
all ages 
Males, 
age>=40 
Married 
males, all 
ages 
Married 
males, 
age>=40 
Bequest motives of interest 
BEQMOTALT 0.082** 0.021 0.079* 0.013 0.060* 0.021 0.061* 0.024 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040) 
BEQMOTCARE 0.141* 0.078 0.146** 0.076 0.133*** 0.131* 0.128*** 0.126* 
 (0.074) (0.088) (0.073) (0.089) (0.050) (0.071) (0.048) (0.069) 
Other bequest motives 
BEQMOTFIN -0.224 -0.310** -0.375** -0.488*** -0.385** -0.527*** -0.369** -0.511*** 
 (0.159) (0.154) (0.149) (0.111) (0.167) (0.164) (0.176) (0.179) 
BEQMOTBUS 0.134 0.102 0.134 0.104 -0.062 -0.071 -0.053 -0.056 
 (0.184) (0.185) (0.189) (0.190) (0.118) (0.124) (0.113) (0.116) 
BEQMOTWEAK 0.033 -0.008 0.039 -0.003 0.022 -0.001 0.035 0.015 
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.036) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041) 
Other explanatory variables 
log(WAGE) 1.112 1.088 1.14 1.152 0.436 0.557 0.314 0.400  
 (1.157) (1.195) (1.358) (1.386) (0.979) (1.065) (0.993) (1.055) logሺWAGEଶሻ -0.054 -0.052 -0.055 -0.056 -0.019 -0.027 -0.011 -0.017 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.093) (0.095) (0.066) (0.072) (0.067) (0.071) 
log(OTHERINC) -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.026 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
BEQREC 0.002 0.023 0.009 0.036 0.002 0.033 -0.001 0.033 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.03) 
BEQEXP 0.072** 0.049 0.063* 0.033 0.062** 0.064* 0.058** 0.057* 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) 
MALE 0.351*** 0.337*** 0.377*** 0.369***     
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)     
MARRIED -0.142*** -0.142**  
 0.166* 0.228**   
 (0.053) (0.058)  
 (0.088) (0.099)   
log(AGE) -0.483*** -0.780*** -0.496*** -0.825*** -0.590*** -0.881*** -0.559*** -0.859*** 
 (0.086) (0.121) (0.092) (0.131) (0.099) (0.132) (0.098) (0.131) 
HEALTH 0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.021 0.013 0.017 0.009 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
WORRY 0.0003 -0.013 -0.013 -0.029* 0.017 0.006 0.011 -0.001 
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 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
WORK -0.008 -0.013 -0.019 -0.024 -0.013 -0.014 -0.018 -0.020  
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
WORKSAT -0.023 -0.004 -0.019 -0.003 -0.001 0.011 -0.003 0.010  
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
SALWKR 0.251*** 0.237*** 0.253*** 0.232*** 0.345*** 0.300*** 0.353*** 0.305*** 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) 
PENSION 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.000  -0.0004 0.0002 -0.001 -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
NUMCHILDREN 0.045** 0.051** 0.041* 0.048* 0.043* 0.047* 0.037 0.038 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) 
GAMBLE 0.047* 0.055* 0.057* 0.065** 0.025 0.029 0.035 0.041 
  (0.029) (0.03) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.03) (0.027) (0.03) 
Correctly 
predicted (%) 77.26 76.77 77.9 70.99 82.31 82.2 81.44 70.99 
McFadden R2 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.15 
# of observations 1,574 1,369 1,452 1,263 899 792 868 763 
 
 
 
 
 
